Fear and Logging in the Internet of Things

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Outline

• Internet of Things
• Background
• ProvThings
• Implementation
• Evaluation
• Conclusion
Internet of Things (IoT)

- A network of interconnected devices/sensors
  - Devices can exchange data via a common interface
  - Interface is connected to the Internet

- As of 2017, the number of IoT devices increased to 8.4 billion
  - By 2020: 30 billion devices
  - By 2020: Market value of IoT is projected to reach $7.1 trillion

- Example: Smart Home
  - Lock/unlock your door with a smart phone application
A Smart Home

Source: The Automization.com
A Smart Home

Source: TheAutomization.com

450+ other vendors!!!
Common Architectures

- All the devices are connected to a **Hub**
- A **Cloud** synchronizes device states and provide interfaces for remote monitoring
- An **App** is a program that manages devices

**Hub-centric & Cloud-centric Architectures**

**Cloud-centric**, but have a **Hub** as well.
Security Concerns

• How to diagnose an incorrect/malicious/misconfiguration behaviors
  • Trigger-action programming can create a chain (flow) of devices and apps together to the point that determining the root cause of an unexpected behavior/event is often difficult.
  
  • Malicious IoT apps may exists in a chain.
  
  • A malicious app may forge a CO detection event and an alarm detection app may sound the alarm because it cannot detect the illegitimate history of the event.

• How to explain the overall system behaviors?
• Need to understand the lineage of triggers and actions that occurs.
Logging in IoT Platforms

• Current logging mechanism in IoT is **device-centric**
  • It is difficult to create a causal dependencies between different events and data states

• Authors analyzed the logs of an Iris System
  • “Motion was detected by Iris indoor camera at 11:13 AM”
  • “Front door was unlocked at 11:13 AM”
  • “Light was turned on at 11:14 AM”

**Why the light was turned on at 11:14 AM?**
Data Provenance

• Describes the **history of actions** taken on a data object from its creation up to the present
  • “In what environment was this data generated?”
  • “Was this message derived from sensitive data?”

The light was turned because motion was detected

Tool: W3C PROV-DM
Its pervasive and represents provenance graph in a DAG

Provenance of Apple HomeKit
PROV-DM [1]

• PROV-DM has three types of nodes
  • **Entity**: is a data object
  • **Activity**: is a process
  • **Agent**: is something that is responsible for Entities and Activities

• **Edges**: encode dependency types between nodes

Which Entity **WasAttributedTo** which Agent
Which Activity **WasAssociatedWith** which Agent
Which Entity **WasGeneratedBy** which Activity

.......
ProvThings: A Framework

• Threat Model & Assumptions
  • **API-level attacks**: attacker is able to access or manipulate the state of the smart home through creation and transition of well-formed API control messages.
  • Accidental App configuration

• Plausible scenarios through which API-level attacks may happen
  • Malicious Apps
  • Device Vulnerabilities
  • Proximity
ProvThings: A Framework

• Assumptions
  • Attacker cannot get the root access of the devices
  • Attacks through communication protocols are out of scope
  • Entity responsible for IoT central management is not compromised
    • SmartThings Cloud
ProvThings: Overview

• ProvThings is a general framework for **collection**, **management**, and **analysis** of data provenance in IoT platform
Provenance Collection

• ProvThings collect provenance metadata from different components of an IoT platform
  • IoT Apps
  • Device Handlers

• Uses **automated program instrumentation** to collect metadata
  • Minimally invasive since it does not do any hardware instrumentation
Program Instrumentation

- ProvThings instruments IoT Apps statically
  - Helps build the **control flow** and **data flow**

- Instrumented App/code collects provenance metadata at runtime

Courtesy: the Authors
Selective Program Instrumentation

- Helps to avoid collecting unnecessary provenance metadata
- Define provenance in terms of **Sources** and **Sinks**
  - **Source**: a security sensitive data object (e.g., state of a lock)
  - **Sink**: a security sensitive method (e.g., command to unlock a door)

Courtesy: the Authors
Provenance Management

• Aggregates and merges provenance records from different collectors, filters them, and converts them into a unified IoT provenance model

• Builds and stores the provenance graph in a database
  • Adds modular support for different backends: SQL, Neo4j.
Provenance Analysis

- **Query APIs**: can analyze forward and backward dependency analysis

- **Policy Engine**: allows users to create configuration, policies in the form of graph

- **Policy Monitor**: Cross-checks with provenance graph if it’s a valid policy or not
Implementation

• Implemented on top of Samsung SmartThings
## Implementation: Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Information Flow</th>
<th>Cross App Analysis</th>
<th>Consider Devices</th>
<th>No Platform Modification</th>
<th>No Developer Effort</th>
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</tbody>
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Evaluation

• Evaluate on five metrics
  1. Effectiveness of attack reconstruction
  2. Instrumentation overhead
  3. Runtime overhead
  4. Storage overhead
  5. Query performance

• Evaluation of 1 and 3 is done at SmartThings IDE cloud
• 2, 4, and 5 is evaluated at a local machine with Intel Core i7-2600 Quad-Core 3.4GHz processor with 16GB RAM running Ubuntu
Evaluation

• Overhead measurements
  • Unmodified (vanilla) SmartApps
  • ProvFull (instruments all instructions to collect provenance data)
  • ProvSave (Apply selective code instrumentation)

• Dataset
  • SmartApps of 26 possible IoT attacks [2]
  • 236 commodity SmartApps

2. ContexIoT, Jia et al. NDSS'17
Evaluation

• ProvThings were able to effectively reconstruct all 26 attacks

• 34ms for SmartApps and 27ms for device handlers as the instrumentation overhead

• 260KB of daily storage overhead
Evaluation

• End-to-end latency on event handling due to provenance collection
  • An event handler sends a text message if motion is detected by a motion sensor, the end-to-end event handling latency is the time between the motion event is received and the time message is delivered to the user.

Tested on both virtual and physical devices

In simulation
ProvSave: 20.6% overhead
ProvFull: 40.4% overhead

Real Devices
ProvSave: 5.3% and 4.5% overhead
ProvFull: 13.8% and 8.7% overhead

2. ContexIoT, Jia et al. NDSS’ 17
Evaluation

- Provenance storage growth & Query performance

-ProvSave incurs less storage costs

-ProvThings can respond quickly to real-time monitoring system

2. ContextIoT, Jia et al. NDSS '17
Conclusion

• ProvThings is a framework for collection, management, and analysis of data provenance in IoT

• Limitations
  • Static Source Code Instrumentation
    • Unable to handle dynamic features of a language
  • Device Integrity
    • ProvThings assumes that the devices are not compromised
    • Compromised devices may cause wrong provenance graphs

2. ContexIoT, Jia et al. NDSS' 17
Questions?